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Abstract 
This paper provides a comparative experimental study of risky prospects (lotteries) and income 
distributions.  The experimental design consisted of multi–outcome lotteries and n–dimensional income 
distributions arranged in the shapes of ten distributions which were judged in terms of ratings and 
valuations, respectively.  Material incentives applied.  We found heavy response–mode effects, which 
cause inconsistent behavior between rating and valuation of lotteries and income distributions in more 
than 50% of all cases.  This means that ethical inequality measures lack support in peoples’ perceptions.  
In addition to classical preference reversals between generalized P–bets and $–bets we observed three 
additional patterns of preference reversal, two of which apply only to income distributions. Dominating 
Lorenz curves and Lorenz curves cutting others from below receive decidedly higher ratings (which 
implies risk and inequality aversion), but lower valuations.  The transfer principle is largely violated.  
The rating of lotteries is a decreasing function of skewness, the rating of income distributions is a 
decreasing function of standard deviation.  The valuation of lotteries is an increasing function of 
standard deviation and kurtosis, and the valuation of income distributions is an increasing function of 
standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis. 
 
KEYWORDS:  Income Distribution, Lotteries, Income Happiness, Inequality and Risk Aversion, 
Ethical Inequality Measures, Preference Reversal. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
 
1.1  Relationships Between Lotteries and Income Distributions 
 
Many scholars have recognized the close relationship between risky prospects and income distributions.  
For instance, Kolm (1969) and Atkinson (1970) established the concept of the equally distributed 
equivalent income [EDE] by analogy with the certainty equivalent [CE] of a lottery.
1  Instead of 
applying results from the theory of risky prospects to income distributions, some authors took the other 
way round, to wit, they applied tools taken from the analysis of income distributions to the analysis of 
risky prospects.  It was, in particular, Lopes (1984, 1987) who put Lorenz curves to good use to study 
lottery experiments.
2  
Following Friedman’s (1953) lead, other scholars, in particular Strotz (1958, 1961) and Kanbur 
(1979, 1982), have modelled the emergence of income distributions as a resultant of decisions under 
risk.  Still other scholars modelled the welfare evaluations of income distributions in terms of expected 
utility.




1.2  Income Happiness 
 
Work on lottery  preferences is well established since the seminal study of von Neumann and 
Morgenstern (1944). Income happiness has been studied in a number of ways, first, using field data for 
time–series and cross–section investigations, second, employing experiments to observe the happiness 
pattern generated by divers payoff structures, and, third, by canvassing the happiness bred by different 
distributional shapes.  Time–series investigators have shown constant mean happiness ratings in the 
                                                 
1Other similarities exist between the transfer principle on the one hand, and mean preserving contractions and 
stochastic dominance on the other, between inequality aversion and risk aversion, between Lorenz dominance and 
risk aversion, and between happiness with income distributions and lottery preferences.  See also Rothschild and 
Stiglitz (1970, 1971, 1973), and, for a generalized presentation, Nermuth (1993). 
2Curiously enough, Lopes (1984), p.  481, went even as far as to reconvert the parameter  e of Atkinson’s 
inequality measure into a measure of subjects’ risk attitudes, which the economist readily identifies as the Arrow–
Pratt measure of relative risk aversion. 
3Cf., e.g., Vickrey (1945, 1960, 1961), Fleming (1952), Goodman and Markovitz (1952), Harsanyi (1953, 1955), 
Dworkin (1981) Dahlby (1987), Kolm (1985, 1998), Epstein and Segal (1992), Fleubaey (1998). 
4Cf., e.g., Blackorby and Donaldson (1978), Cowell (1985), Cowell and Kuga (1981),  Chakravarty (1990), 
Blackorby, Bossert, and Donaldson (2001).   3 
lapse of time, even across p eriods of vigorous income growth.
5  In contrast to that, cross–section 
analyses have shown a distinct positive correlation of happiness with income levels.
6  
The lesson of cross–sectional field data shows us that relativity matters for income happiness.  This 
has by and large been confirmed by experimental research. Loewenstein, Thompson, and Bazerman 
(1989) and, in particular, Bazerman, Loewensein, and White (1992) observed that, in the space of 
payments to self and one other person, subjects rate a more equal payoff distribution higher, even if it 
implies inferior payments for self than a more unequal distribution.
7  This attitude demonstrates a robust 
violation of the Pareto principle, which caused McClelland and Rohrbaugh (1978) to entitle their paper 
with the question “Who Accepts the Pareto Axiom?”. 
These findings readily translate into happiness in the workplace, endowed, however, with a 
preference inversion between happiness perception and job choice.  Subjects express greater happiness 
for jobs with less pay when salaries are more equally distributed than for jobs with more pay which falls 
off from their mates’ salaries. At the same time, when faced with job choices, subjects opt for the 
higher–paid job, accepting thus some relative deprivation resulting from the unequal salaries.
8 Tversky 
and Griffin (1991, p. 117) explain this behavior as the resultant of two countervailing effects, viz. the 
endowment effect (depending on the quality and the intensity of an event), and the contrast effect 
(depending on an event’s similarity with or relevance for other events). They argue that judgments of 
well–being are insufficiently sensitive to endowment, whereas choice is insufficiently sensitive to 
contrast.  Therefore, welfare policy derived from Pareto optimality could result in allocations that make 
most people less happy because it ignores the effect of social comparison.  A preoccupation with 
judgment, on the other hand, may be misleading because it ignores endowment effects. 
The contrast effect has led Parducci (1968, p. 90) to claim that happiness results from the shape of 
the distribution:  
What the theory suggests is that happiness is a negatively skewed distribution. If the best can 
come only rarely, it is better not to include it in the range of experiences at all. The average level 
of happiness can be raised by arranging life so that high levels of satisfaction come frequently, 
                                                 
5Cf., e.g., Easterlin (1974, 1995, 2001), Smith (1979), Kenney (1999), Blanchflower and Oswald (2000). For 
individuals, it seems that, in the course of time, subjects put up with their (un)fortunate fate:  Brickman, Coates, 
and Janoff–Bulman (1978) did not observe major differences in the reported happiness of the winners of top 
lottery prizes and paraplegics, respectively, when compared with control groups.  Of course, adaptation takes place 
only after a longer spell. 
6Cf., e.g., Duncan (1975), Veenhoven (1993), Diener and Oishi (2002). Notice, however, that questions posed 
within happiness polls may be severely impaired by framing effects; for a striking example see Turner and Krauss 
(1978). 
7For similar findings cf.  also Conrath and Deci (1969), Radzicki (1976), McClelland and Rohrbaugh (1978), 
Rohrbaugh, McClelland, and Quinn (1980), Messick and Sentis (1985), Charness and Grosskopf (2001) observe a 
negative correlation of happiness and willingness to lower another person’s payoff below one’s own.  For contrary 
results cf.  Hoffman and Spitzer (1982, 1985) and van Avermaet (1974). 
8Cf., e.g., Schmitt and Marwell (1972), Ross and McMillen (1973), Austin, McGinn, and Susmilch (1980), 
Tversky and Griffin (1991), Blount and Bazerman (1996), Traub, Seidl, and Morone (2002). Clark and Oswald 
(1996) observed related results for British field data.   4 
even if this requires renunciation of the opportunity for occasional experiences that would be even 
more gratifying.  
 
1.3  Methodological Advances 
 
Before describing our investigations, let us accentuate the methodological advances of this research. 
First, joint analyses of risky prospects and income distributions are much in their infancy.
9  The 
most comprehensive joint analysis of risky prospects and income distributions so far seems to be 
Bernasconi’s (2002) paper.  This author investigated distributional axioms and their counterparts in risk 
analysis.  He tested the independence axiom, the betweenness axiom (randomization aversion, 
neutrality, or preference), the transfer principle/mean preserving contractions, and Pareto 
dominance/first order stochastic dominance. Bernasconi did not observe dramatic systematic differences 
between framing modes,
10  but found a joint rejection of Harsanyi’s social welfare function with respect 
to the evaluation of income distributions, and expected utility for the evaluation of lotteries. 
Second, material incentives seem to have hardly ever been used in experiments on income 
distributions.
11  Although Camerer and Hogarth (1999) provided evidence that the role of material 
incentives seems to have been overstated by economists,
12 the widespread absence of material 
incentives is alarming, because, if they matter for income distributions, there is no chance of detecting 
this dependence, as they were never applied.  In the present paper, material incentives were applied both 
to motivate subjects to reveal their true preferences and to warrant that they make efforts at a proper 
understanding of the experimental design. 
Third, the experimental stimuli of most experiments with lotteries and virtually all experiments of 
income happiness consist of binary relations, i.e., payments to self and other.
13  Yet risky events are 
                                                 
9Cf.  Cowell and Schokkaert (2001) for a literature survey.  Amiel, Cowell, and Polovin (2001) report a 
predominance of Dalton cases [Dalton (1920) has considered both equal proportionate and equal absolute 
additions to all incomes to increase income inequality] for inequalitiy perceptions.  Yet their experimental design 
confuses lottery dominance with the perception of income inequality. 
10It seems that his rather heterogeneous subject groups impaired the quality of his data, as he did not control for 
systematic differences in his subjects’ characteristics (students of a state university versus students of a private 
university with high fees). 
11Cf., e.g., Amiel and Cowell (1992, 1994a,b, 1998, 199a,b), Harrison and Seidl (1994a,b), Amiel, Cowell, and 
Polovin (2001), Bernasconi (2002). Exceptions are the papers by Traub, Seidl, Schmidt, and Levati (2001), by 
Schmidt, Seidl, Traub, and Levati (2002), and by Seidl, Traub, and Morone (2002), but these three papers are still 
unpublished.  The only published work using material incentives seems to be the article by Beckman, Formby, 
Smith, and Zheng (2002). 
12Psychologis ts do not consider material incentives as the hub of a decent experimental design.  They often award 
course credits to their subjects, which may well substitute monetary payoffs. 
13The binary concept of inequality aversion as developed by Loewenstein, Thompson, and Bazerman (1989) was 
generalized by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), p.822, to the n–person case, but has not yet been tested in experiments.  
Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) model a subject’s utility as a function of own absolute payoff and his or her share in 
total payoffs, but not as a function of payoff distribution.  Similar ideas were developed by philosopher Temkin 
(1986, 1993). Temkin suggests that inequality aversion results from the complaints of income recipients in the low   5 
seldom dichotomous beyond the laboratory, but consist of multiple outcomes, and binary income 
distributions cannot claim relevance beyond a Robinson–and–Friday world.  Multi–outcome lotteries, it 
is true, have been pioneered by Schneider and Lopes, but they used them either to critically re–examine 
the reflection effect [Schneider and Lopes (1986)], or to investigate subjects’ risk attitudes [Lopes 
(1984, 1987)]. Analyses of income happiness by way of field data do not investigate subjects’ emotions 
vis–à–vis income distributions, but consider either subjects’ relative position across income echelons, or 
with respect to a reference point, such as mean income. The present paper is based on multi-outcome 
lotteries and multiple income distributions throughout. 
Fourth, it is well known from experimental work that response-mode effects abound in many 
elicitation procedures of subjects’ attitudes. To check for response-mode effects, happiness with 
lotteries and income distributions was elicited in terms of two response modes, viz.  rating scales and 
valuation (EDE and CE, respectively). 
 
1.4  Investigations 
 
After a description of our experiment, we investigate four issues in this paper. 
In Section 3.1 we scrutinize the preference–reversal phenomenon. Preference reversal was first 
observed by Lichtenstein, Lindman, and Slovic
14 as a response–mode effect in the evaluation of 
lotteries.  The experimental design to demonstrate that is quite easy:  There are two lotteries, a so–called 
P–bet, which accords a modest payoff with a high probability, and a so–called $–bet, which accords a 
high payoff with a low probability.  A substantial fraction of subjects express preference for the P–bet, 
but assign a higher CE (usually measured in terms of a selling price
15 ) to the $–bet. 
This prompts, first, the question of whether and in what manner preference reversal in terms of 
lotteries extends also to multi–outcome lotteries.  Indeed, Casey (1991) generalized the P –bet as a 
negatively skewed distribution and the $–bet as a positively skewed distribution, but it seems that he 
prematurely abandoned research with multi–outcome lotteries.
16  
                                                                                                                                                                  
income echelons akin to relative deprivation.  However, he seems to have neglected possible complaints of income 
recipients in the high income echelons, as they may well consider the poor persons’ incomes as being still too 
high.  Levine’s (1998) model aims at an explanation of altruism and spitefulness rather than at a modelling and a 
test of income happiness. 
14Lindman (1965, 1971), Slovic and Lichtenstein (1968), Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971). For a comprehensive 
literature survey cf.  Seidl (2002). 
15Combining high lottery payoffs with bid prices, Casey (1991) observed reverse preference reversals. 
16For his work with multi–outcome lotteries he used an experimental design akin to that one developed by 
Schneider and Lopes (1986) and Lopes (1984, 1987). But, as Casey (1991, p. 237), other than Weber (1984), did 
not observe major differences from binary lotteries, he did not resume working with multi–outcome lotteries in his 
second experiment.  He reports (p. 232) that Weber (1984) had found distinctly less preference reversals for three–
outcome bets. However, Casey could not evidence that for his experiment.   6 
Second, it prompts the question of whether preference reversal is confined to the juxtaposition of 
negatively and positively skewed distributions only, or whether preference reversal exists also for 
lottery pairs beyond positively and negatively skewed lotteries. This would imply the discovery of new 
patterns of preference reversal. 
Third, it prompts the question of whether the preference reversal phenomenon carries over to 
income distributions as well, that is, whether observational inconsistencies exist also between 
preferences among income distributions and their associated EDEs. To illustrate, suppose x and y denote 
two income distributions arranged in nondecreasing order with the same mean and in the same 
dimension.  Let denote a subject’s preference or happiness relation in the space of income distributions.  
Then we would expect  
 
  EDE(x)EDE(y)￿xy.  (1) 
 
In terms of the Atkinson–Kolm–Sen terminology,  is expressed in terms of a homothetic social welfare 
function.
17  Now, if (1) is violated,
18 the perception of income distributions, too, depends on the 
response mode.  This means that, if preference reversal haunts income distributions in a similar way as 
it haunts risky prospects, then ethical measures of inequality become devoid of a perceptional bedrock. 
Whereas preference reversal implies the comparison of the ratings and the valuations of lotteries 
and income distributions, respectively, pairs of lotteries and income distributions can be compared 
according to the pattern of their cumulants.  This comes up to their comparison in terms of Lorenz 
curves, to which we turn in Section 3.2. A Lorenz curve can either dominate another or intersect 
another.  When the respective lotteries or income distributions have the same mean, Lorenz domination 
is equivalent to respecting mean–preserving contractions (for lotteries) or the transfer principle (for 
income distributions). Moreover, it comes up to risk aversion (for lotteries; see Lopes (1984, 1987)) or 
to inequality aversion (for income distributions). In this paper we investigate whether Lorenz dominance 
is matched by the ratings and by the evaluations of lotteries and income distributions, respectively. 
Lorenz curves which intersect exactly once provide also interesting patterns to be investigated.  
Subjects, who mind an unequal income distribution at the lower end of a Lorenz curve less than at the 
upper end, should opt for lotteries or income distributions whose Lorenz curve cuts another from below.  
We also investigate which pattern is matched by the ratings and the evaluations of lotteries and income 
distributions, respectively. An alternative check of risk aversion or the transfer principle is the 
comparison of a lottery’s CE or an income distribution’s EDE with its mean, m. Risk aversion holds if 
                                                 
17For nonhomothetic social welfare functions relation (1) continues to hold if we choose a reference welfare level 
w such that W(x)wW(y). For technical details cf.  Blackorby and Donaldson (1978), p.  64. 
18Note that (1) is already violated if one inequality sign is strict and points in the opposite direction.  Thus, we do 
not restrict ourselves to strict preference reversals which require that both inequality signs are strict and point in 
opposite directions.   7 
CE<m, inequality aversion holds if EDE<m. In Section 3.3 of this paper, we investigate violations of risk 
and inequality aversion, in particular violations of the transfer principle. 
The influence of the shape of a lottery or an income distribution on subjects’ happiness (in 
particular, Parducci’s conjecture that negatively skewed distributions breed happiness) seems to have 
never been experimentally investigated in a systematic way.  In order to do this, the endowment effect 
and the contrast effect [Tversky and Griffin (1991)] have to be disentangled, and the contrast effect has 
to be isolated.  This requires to analyze the shapes of different lotteries or income distributions with the 
same mean.  In particular, Parducci’s (1968) claim that negatively skewed distributions breed greater 
happiness has not been precisely specified.  Does it apply to lotteries, to income distributions, and does 
it depend on the response mode?  In Section 3.4 of this paper we investigate this question together with 
a check of ordering and cultural effects. 
Of course, we are well aware that happiness is a multifarious phenomenon which i s decisively 
shaped by perceptions of distributional equity.
19  Therefore, we adopted a simple experimental design 
and avoided any remarks (e.g., concerning work effort or talents) which might have triggered equity 
considerations which could not be controlled for.  Also we carried out our experiments in terms of the 
local currency and concluded them well before the introduction of the EURO (€) to avoid effects of 
money illusion and transitory effects of yet insufficient acquaintance with and adaptation to the new 
currency. For the sake of analytical comparability, however, we express all figures and tables in terms 
of  €. 
 
2.  The Experiment 
 
The experimental design consisted of two experiments, one concerning lotteries, and one concerning 
income distributions. Each experiment encompassed two parts, a rating part, and a valuation part.  Both 
experiments were administered at the ESSE laboratory at the University of Bari in Italy, as well as at the 
LEE laboratory at the University Jaume I in Castellón, Spain. 53 subjects participated in the lottery 
experiment and 57 subjects participated in the income distribution experiment in Bari; 52 subjects 
participated in the lottery experiment and 50 subjects participated in the income distribution experiment 
in Castellón.  Subjects were only admitted to one experiment to avoid anchor effects.  The data of three 
subjects had to be discarded,
20  which left us with the following usable data:  52 subjects for lotteries in 
                                                 
19Cf.  Miller (1995) for a good survey of empirical results.  Subjects’ perceptions are often blurred and 
inconsistent.  Moreover, there are large differences in attitudes across nations. 
20One subject in Italy rated every lottery with 10, telling the experimenter that this was his fortune number.  One 
subject in Italy provided the same EDE for all distributions.  One subject in Spain provided CEs which all 
exceeded the maximum payoff of the respective lotteries.   8 
Italy, 56 subjects for income distributions in Italy, 51 subjects for lotteries in Spain, 50 subjects for 
income distributions in Spain. 
The stimulus material consisted of ten distributions the graphs of whose density functions are 
displayed in Figures  1,  2, and  3. Distributions 1 –3 are negatively skewed, Distributions 4 –7 are 
positively skewed (the distributional shape which governs all empirical income distributions), 
Distribution 8 is unimodal, Distribution 9 is rectangular, and Distribution 10 is bimodal.  The 
distributions were presented in the format developed by Lopes (1984, 1987) and Schneider and Lopes 
(1986). Each distribution had the same expected value of some €1,800, save for differences in rates of 
exchange and rounding errors in order to secure decent numbers in terms of the local currency (Lire and 
Pesetas, respectively).
21  The exact parameters of the distributions (mean, standard deviation, skewness, 
kurtosis
22, minimum, maximum, range, and Gini coefficient) are shown in Table 1. 
Insert Figures 1, 2 and 3 about here 
Insert Table 1 about here 
Both lotteries and income distributions may be arranged in terms of Lorenz curves.  Two Lorenz 
curves may either intersect or one may dominate the other.  As these relationships have important 
implications for risk aversion (for lotteries) and for the transfer principle (for income distributions), as 
well as for subjects’ attitudes to low or high lottery prizes and incomes, respectively, we show the 
pattern of Lorenz relationships of our experimental design in Figure 4:  An increasing arrow means that 
the Lorenz curve of the lottery or income distribution of the respective line cuts the Lorenz curve of the 
lottery or income distribution of the respective column from below, where intersections within two 
percentage points from the lower and the upper end were ignored.  A horizontal arrow means that the 
Lorenz curve of the lottery or income distribution of the respective line dominates the Lorenz curve of 
the lottery or income distribution of the respective column.  A tilde means that parts of the respective 
Lorenz curves coincide. 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
Let us first focus on the experiment pertaining lotteries.  At the beginning, subjects were asked to 
read carefully the instructions and the payment regulations.  To make sure that subjects properly 
understood the experiment, they had then to pass an examination consisting of ten multiple–choice 
questions.  Subjects were informed that for each incorrectly answered question they had to face a 10% 
cut of their payoff; if they had only a record of five or less correct answers, they would be excluded 
from any payoff.
23  
                                                 
21Due to such influences the average level of entries in terms of € was some 3.4% lower in Spain than in Italy.  
The actual figures for the means were about €1,807 in Italy and €1,745 in Spain. 
22Kurtosis is defined as the fourth central moment of the distribution less 3 (i.e., the value of the fourth central 
moment of a normal distribution with parameters m=0 and s=1). 
23Out of 110 subjects in Italy, only five scored at 6 or 7 correctly answered questions for both experiments; all 
others scored at least at eight correctly answered questions.  In Spain, 11 out of 102 subjects scored at 7 for both 
experiments; all others scored better.   9 
Then subjects received a booklet with two times the ten lotteries as described in Table 1 and 
presented in the Schneider-Lopes format in terms of the local currencies.  The order of presentation was 
(1,4,5,2,3,8,9,10,6,7) in Italy, and, to control for order effects, (7,6,10,9,8,3,2,5,4,1) in Spain.
24  Subjects 
were arranged in groups of about ten.  The lottery prices were arranged in terms of 100 tally marks.  
Subjects were told that each tally mark in the lotteries represented exactly one ticket equal in value to 
the amount listed in the respective line of the distribution of the lottery.  Subjects had an equal chance to 
draw one of the 100 tickets of the respective lottery.  Subjects were asked to state on a 20–point rating 
scale their degree of happiness [1 means very unhappy, 20 means very happy] to play the respective 
lottery, as well as their CE (as a selling price) which was elicited by way of the Becker–DeGroot–
Marschak [BDM] incentive scheme, whose working was carefully explained to subjects. 
For each subject, a pair of lotteries was drawn at random, and the higher ranked lottery
25  was 
played out, whose result represented the first part of tokens.  The second part of tokens came from the 
BDM incentive scheme.  Another lottery was drawn for each subject.  Then a draw was made from a 
uniform distribution defined on the support of this distribution.  If the draw was less than CE, the 
respective lottery was played out.  If the draw was greater or equal CE, then subject got tokens 
amounting to the drawn number (second part of tokens). A subject’s total of tokens was then made up as 
the sum of the two token parts.  Payoffs were determined by dividing the total number of tokens by 500. 
The income-distribution part of the experiment differed only in minor points from the lottery part.  
Subjects were told that the population consisted of 100 millions of income earners, and that each tally 
mark in a distribution represented exactly 1 million of income earners.  The figures represented monthly 
incomes because subjects are more accustomed to monthly salaries in Italy and Spain.  Subjects were 
solicited to imagine to have an equal chance to become one of the 100 millions of income earners in this 
society.  Subjects were told that they would not know ex ante their precise income in this society.  All 
they knew was the distribution of monthly incomes.  They were then asked to state on a 20–point rating 
scale their degree of happiness to enter a society in which the respective income distribution obtained.  
The rating scale extended from 1 (very unhappy) to 20 (very happy). 
Thereafter, subjects were asked to imagine that they could alternatively enter a society in which all 
income earners had the same monthly income.  They were invited to indicate this level of income such 
that they were indifferent between the respective income distribution and the alternative in which each 
person receives the same income [EDE]. 
Subjects were arranged in groups of about ten persons.  In contrast to the lottery part of the 
experiment, subjects were informed that income distributions had to obtain for the group as a whole. 
Therefore, one participant of the group would be randomly chosen, and, for this particular person, two 
                                                 
24We assumed only modest cultural effects between Italy and Spain, which allows to test order effects.  Contrary 
to that, we are able to show in Section 3.4 that order effects are absent, but some cultural effects exist for the 
ratings of income distributions only.   10 
income distributions would then be randomly chosen.  The higher rated income distribution would 
become the group’s income distribution, and all subjects in this group would be assigned tokens 
according to this same income distribution.  Thereby, every subject had to resume responsibility for the 
income distribution of the whole group.  A separate draw was made from this very distribution for any 
subject in the group.  This constituted the first part of tokens of a subject.  The second part of tokens 
came from the BDM incentive scheme applied to each particular subject’s statement of EDE for the 
selected income distribution.  For this income distribution a draw was made from a uniform distribution 
defined on the support of the group’s income distribution; if the draw was less than EDE, then a draw 
from this income distribution was made; if the draw was greater or equal to EDE, then the subject got 
tokens amounting to the drawn number (second part of tokens). A subject’s total of tokens was then 
made up as the sum of the two token parts.  Payoffs were determined by dividing the total number of 
tokens by 500. Subjects received a mean payoff of about €6.50. Every session lasted about one hour. 
 
3.  Results 
 
When screening the data, we noticed that subjects made different use of the 20–point rating scale.  Some 
settled more on the lower end, some on the upper end, and some dwelt on extremes.  To avoid assigning 
different weights to subjects, we calibrated the rating scales, assigning a 1 to the lowest ranked lottery or 
income distribution, and a 10 to the highest ranked lottery or income distribution according to the 
formula:   
 
 
} { min } { max
9
}] { min [ 1
j j j j
j j i i R R
R R r
-
- + =  
 
where Ri’s denote the noncalibrated and the ri’s the calibrated ratings. 
The results are arranged in four subsections.  First we shall analyze preference reversals, second the 
conformity of subjects’ behavior with the Lorenz relations of the experimental design, third violations 





                                                                                                                                                                  
25Ties were resolved by a random device.   11 
3.1  Preference Reversals 
 
To study preference reversals, we start with a summary statistic of the results, which is provided by 
Table 2. 
 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
So far, preference reversals were studied exclusively in terms of lotteries.  Lottery preferences were 
elicited either by way of a choice between two lotteries, or by way of rating lotteries on a point scale,
26 
and comparing them with their CEs. To have an amenable experimental design and to avoid the 
necessity to control for intransitivities, we settled on the latter method,
27  i.e., we elicited subjects’ 
preferences by the above–mentioned 20–point rating scale for income distributions and lotteries, which 
was calibrated to its pure ordering on a 10–point rating scale. 
When canvassing Table 2 for deviations of ratings and valuations for  pairs of distributions or 
groups of pairs of distributions, we encounter a wealth of preference reversals.  Most spectacularly, 
Table 2 shows us that the average ratings of the negatively skewed lotteries and income distributions are 
higher than the average ratings of the positively skewed lotteries and income distributions,
28  whereas 
the opposite holds for the valuations, that is, the CEs and the EDEs are lower for the negatively skewed 
distributions than for the positively skewed distributions.
29  Recall that this is the generalized version of 
the classical preference reversal phenomenon, which is, according to Table 2, not confined to lotteries, 
but extends also to income distributions!  
Moreover, Table 2 suggests that we strike three additional patterns of preference reversals:  First, 
there is a tendency for negatively skewed distributions to exhibit higher ratings and lower valuations 
than the unimodal, rectangular, and bimodal distributions.  This applies both for lotteries and income 
distributions.  Second, there is a tendency for distributions (4) and (5) to exhibit higher ratings and 
lower valuations than distributions (6) and (7). This phenomenon is confined to income distributions 
only.  Third, Table 2 shows a tendency for distributions (8), (9), and (10) to exhibit higher ratings and 
lower valuations than distributions (6) and (7), a phenomenon which is, too, confined to income 
                                                 
26See, for the latter method, Slovic and Lichtenstein (1968), pp.10-11; Goldstein and Einhorn (1987), p.239; 
Schkade and Johnson (1989), p.219; Tversky, Slovic and Kahneman (1990), p.213. Similarly to ours, Goldstein 
and Einhorn (1987) and Tversky, Slovic and Kahneman (1990) used rating scales reaching from 0 to 20 points. 
27The choice method of preference elicitation is more appropriate for simple experiments, whereas the rating 
method is preferable for more complicated experimental designs.  Note that both methods are equivalent.  Having 
applied both methods, Tversky, Slovic and Kahneman (1990) p.213, report:  “The data reveal no discrepancy 
between choice and rating." 
28Using the Wilcoxon signed ranks test the differences are statistically significant at the 1% level. 
29Using the Wilcoxon signed ranks test, the differences are statistically significant at the 1% level for the lotteries 
in Italy and for the income distributions in Italy and Spain.  For lotteries in Spain, the difference is statistically 
significant at the 5% level.   12 
distributions.  Thus, we observe another pattern of preference reversals which hold both for lotteries and 
income distributions, and two more patterns of preference reversals which hold for income distributions 
only. 
We just noted some tendencies of traditional and new preference reversals.  Let us now check their 
significance.  Table 3 presents the results of a Wilcoxon test of preference reversal.  If the average rating 
of the distribution in a line of this table exceeds the rating of the distribution in the respective column, 
while, at the same time, the valuation of the distribution of this column exceeds the valuation of the 
distribution of the respective line, and both differences are significant at the 5% level under a Wilcoxon 
test, then there appears a respective entry in Table 3.
30  We see that our conjecture about preference 
reversal is confirmed for many relations.  There are only two significant preference reversals [cells (1,3) 
and (8,9)] outside the regions of the the tendencies for preference reversals. 
 
Insert Table 3 about here 
 
By comparison with Table 3, notice the particularities of distributions (6) and (7):  They have low 
minimum values and the highest maximum values of payoffs and incomes, respectively, and, thus, the 
highest standard deviations. Inequality aversion suggests, therefore, a higher rating of income 
distributions (1)–(5) and (8)–(9) as compared with the ratings of income distributions (6) and (7). The 
valuation, on the other hand, receives its direction from the maximum incomes under the respective 
income distributions.
31  
Tables 2 and 3 show us the incidence of preference reversals for aggregate data. Individual data 
contribute another quality of information to study preference reversals.  Tables 4 –7 contain the 
respective results. 
Insert Tables 4–7 about here 
These tables are arranged that, when reading the lines, the lottery or income distribution of the 
respective line has a higher rating than the lottery or income distribution of the respective column, 
whereas the CE or the EDE of the lottery or the income distribution of the line is smaller than the CE or 
EDE of the lottery or the income distribution of the respective column.  When reading the columns, the 
lottery or income distribution of the respective column has a lower rating than the lottery or income 
distribution of the respective line, whereas the CE or EDE of the lottery or income distribution of the 
respective column is greater than the CE or EDE of the lottery or income distribution of the respective 
                                                 
30LI means lottery for Italian subjects, LS lottery for Spanish subjects, DI income distribution for Italian subjects, 
and DS means income distribution for Spanish subjects. 
31Slovic, Griffin and Tversky (1990) explain preference reversal by the joint operation of the prominence 
hypothesis and the compatibility hypothesis. Probability is more prominent for the rating of distributions, whereas, 
for the evaluation exercise, attributes are weighted more heavily in the comparison of alternatives when they were 
common. As valuation is cast in terms of money, desirable results, that is, high payoffs or incomes, determine 
valuation.  For greater details, see Seidl (2002), Section 4.3.   13 
line.  To illustrate, cell (1,8) in Table 4 tells us that 25 out of 52 Italian subjects displayed a preference 
reversal in the sense that they rated lottery (1) higher than or equal to lottery (8), but assigned a CE to 
lottery (1) which is smaller than or equal to the CE assigned to lottery (8), where at least one inequality 
holds strictly.  Cell (8,1) in Table 4 tells us that none out of 52 Italian subjects showed a preference 
reversal between these two lotteries which is opposite to the one in cell (1,8). 
Note that all entries in Tables 4–7 concern inconsistencies between ratings and valuations.
32  All 
taken together, we observe 47.6% inconsistencies for lotteries out of a total of 2340 cases [45 
comparisons of distributions times 52 subjects] in Italy and 52.9% in Spain.  Inconsistencies for income 
distributions amount to 57.0% in Italy and 57.5% in Spain.  The complementary percentages refer to 
consistent behavior. 
Inconsistencies which feature a marked asymmetric behavior are addressed as preference reversals.  
In order to identify preference reversals, we applied a binomial test to probe whether the entries in the 
cells (i,j) and (j,i) are significantly different or not.  Recall that a negatively skewed distribution is a 
generalized P –bet, and a positively skewed distribution is a generalized $ –bet.  Then classical 
preference reversal would predict a high incidence in the area delimited by the cells (1,4), (1,7), (3,4), 
and (3,7), and a low incidence in the area delimited by cells (4,1), (4,3), (7,1), and (7,3). Table 4 shows 
us that classical preference reversal holds for eleven out of twelve cases, the cells (2,4) and (4,2) 
forming the sole exception.  The same holds for classical preference reversal for the Spanish data on 
lotteries in Table 5, where the cells (3,5) and (5,3) form the sole exception.  A new type of preference 
reversal is manifested as a high incidence in the area delimited by cells (1,8), (1,10), (3,8), and (3,10), 
and a low incidence in the area delimited by cells (8,1), (8,3), (10,1), and (10,3). This applies fully to the 
Spanish data and to the Italian data with two exceptions out of nine cases.  There are no other areas of 
similar patterns of preference reversals for Italy and Spain with the exception of two cases [cells (8,9) 
and (9,8) and cells (2,3) and (3,2), respectively]. Thus, the results observed from Tables 2 and 3 for 
lotteries are duly reflected in Tables 4 and 5. 
Whereas Tables 4 and  5 show only two kinds of preference reversal, Tables  6 and  7 reveal a 
plethora of preference reversals.  Classical preference reversal [high incidence in the area delimited by 
cells (1,4), (1,7), (3,4), and (3,7), and a low incidence in the area delimited by cells (4,1), (4,3), (7,1), 
and (7,3)] is prevalent both for the Italian [three exceptions] and Spanish [two exceptions] data.  The 
new preference reversal discovered for lotteries [high incidence in the area delimited by cells (1,8), 
(1,10), (3,8), and (3, 10), and low incidence in the area delimited by cells (8,1), (8,3), (10,1), and (10,3)] 
is established also for income distributions with one exception for the Italian data. 
                                                 
32Note the difference of the data making up Table 2 on the one hand, and Tables 4–7 on the other:  Whereas Table 
2 contains subjects’ average ratings and valuations encompassing their consistent behavior, Tables 4 –7 are 
restricted to inconsistent behavior only.   14 
The second type of new preference reversals noted for the aggregate income distribution data is also 
reflected in the individual data on income distributions:  There is a distinct pattern of preference reversal 
between distributions (4) and (5) on the one hand, and (6) and (7) on the other, which signals a 
prevalence of inequality aversion for ratings and equality aversion for valuations.  Note that this pattern 
of preference reversal is absent for lottery data. 
The third type of preference reversal, i.e., income distributions (8), (9), and (10) on the one hand, 
and (6) and (7) on the other, is fully evidenced for the Spanish data [even for (9) against (6) in contrast 
to Table 3], and evidenced only for (8) versus (6) and (7) for the Italian data [in accordance with Table 
3]. It, too, signals inequality aversion for ratings and equality aversion for valuations. 
Some minor patterns of preference reversal are also shown in the data, such as (1) and (2) versus 
(3), yet most of them reflect no common feature but seem to result from cultural effects dividing the 
Italian and Spanish data.  Cultural effects are resumed in Section 3.4. 
Theoretical considerations and inspection of Tables  2–7 have shown that there exists definite 
patterns of preference reversals among the income distributions and lotteries of our experimental design.  
Moreover, although these patterns seem to be more similar within income distributions and lotteries, 
respectively, the preference reversal patterns bear also similarity between income distributions on the 
one hand, and lotteries on the other. To investigate that we compare the structure of the border 
distributions of the individual data on preference reversals.  Table 8 shows the Pearson correlation 
coefficients and the Spearman rank correlation coefficients between the border distributions of Tables 
4–7. 
Insert Table 8 about here 
Above–diagonal entries in Table 8 are the correlation coefficients of the right margins of Tables 4–
7, below–diagonal entries in Table 8 are the correlation coefficients of the bottom margins of Tables 4–
7. We see that the correlation coefficients of preference reversals between the lotteries and between the 
income distributions in Italy and Spain are highest.
33  Moreover, Table 8 shows similar structures of 
preference reversals between the lotteries and the income distributions, both within and between the 
countries.  Although this similarity is less pronounced than the similarity of lotteries and income 
distributions, respectively, across the countries, it is nevertheless statistically significant at least at the 
5% level. 
Recall that consistent behavior of ratings and valuations makes up the complement to the total of 
cases.  Although we did our best to detect principles governing consistent behavior, we failed to 
pinpoint specific patterns. 
 
                                                 
33There are two exceptions, viz.  both correlation coefficients for the lotteries of the right margin distributions of 
Tables 4 and 5.   15 
 
 
3.2  Conformity of Behavior with Lorenz Relations 
 
Notice that the transfer principle in the field of income distributions is equivalent to mean–preserving 
contractions in the field of lotteries.  Every transfer satisfying the transfer principle shifts the Lorenz 
curve closer to the diagonal.  Any mean–preserving contraction of lotteries, too, shifts the associate 
Lorenz curve of the respective lottery closer to the diagonal.  Thus, risk averse and inequality averse 
subjects should prefer Lorenz curves closer to the diagonal; the opposite should hold for risk or 
inequality loving subjects [Lopes (1984), p. 475]. 
What about intersecting Lorenz curves?  Suppose that the Lorenz  curve of lottery or income 
distribution x cuts the Lorenz curve of lottery or income distribution y; suppose further that the lotteries 
or income distributions have the same mean.  Then subjects who want to avoid the expectation of 
relatively low payoffs or incomes should prefer income distributions [lotteries] whose Lorenz curves lie 
near the diagonal at the low end, and subjects who are sympathetic to the expectation of relatively high 
payoffs or incomes should prefer lotteries or income distributions whose Lorenz curves lie close to the 
diagonal at the high end [Lopes (1987), p. 270]. Then, if the Lorenz curve of x intersects the Lorenz 
curve of y from below, x should be preferred to y by subjects who do not mind low payoffs or incomes 
provided that they are outnumbered by sufficiently many moderate or high payoffs or incomes. 
We employ the mean calibrated ratings and valuations to canvass conformity with the Lorenz 
relations of the experimental design as exposed in Figure 4. A summary statistic is provided in Table 9. 
This table is based on the data provided in Table 9. Its entries are calculated from eight times forty-five 
comparisons [(10·9)/2] of pairs of distributions with the relations arranged in Figure 4. The presentation 
of the results is separated for Lorenz dominance and Lorenz cutting from below and normalized for the 
total number of the respective Lorenz relations according to Figure 4. For instance, the entry 92.3% in 
the cell “Lotteries/Cutting Lorenz Curves/Ratings/Italy" means that 12 out of the 13 crossing Lorenz 
curves of Figure 4 coincide for the figures exposed in Table 2 for the Italian data on lottery ratings.  The 
entries under “All cases" refer to the coincidence of the data from Table 2 with all 45 Lorenz relations 
of Figure 4. What strikes us at first sight is the inverse mirror–image of the first two and the second two 
columns in Table 9. While the large majority of mean ratings corresponds with Lorenz dominance and 
Lorenz curves cutting others form below, the large majority of mean valuations is opposite the relations 
as displayed in Figure 4. Moreover, there are notable differences within this pattern:  For lotteries, the 
mean ratings are higher for the Lorenz curves cutting others from below.  This means that subjects have 
a look at the higher incomes and prefer respective lotteries if higher incomes outnumber low incomes.  
This figure shrinks to about two thirds for Lorenz dominance.  This means that, for dominating Lorenz   16 
curves, two thirds display risk aversion on average.  This pattern prevails also for the rating of income 
distributions in Spain, but is contrary for the income distributions in Italy.  Here people display a high 
degree of inequality aversion, but care somewhat more for the low incomes in case of intersecting 
Lorenz curves. 
For the valuation exercise, only some 10% in Italy and some 15% in Spain conform with the entries 
in Figure 4. This reflects the impression, observed in the preceding section, that it is the high payoffs 
and incomes which determine valuations.   This shows that inequality and risk attitudes are largely 
determined by response–mode effects:  In the rating mode, subjects’ behavior is more coined by risk 
and inequality aversion.  In the valuation mode, subjects’ behavior is more determined by risk sympathy 
and equality aversion, which is a reflection of a greater influence of the high payoffs or incomes due to 
the compatibility hypothesis. 
Insert Table 9 about here 
Conformity with the Lorenz relations can also be investigated for individual data.  For this purpose 
we screened for each subject his or her data for the 45 pairwise comparisons of lotteries, summed over 
all subjects and all 13 crossing Lorenz relations and 32 Lorenz dominations, and expressed the 
respective figures as percentages of 13 or 32 times the number of subjects in the respective group.  The 
results of these data are shown in Table 10. Although the results are less pronounced for the individual 
data than for the aggregate data, the basic results hold good:  The majority of ratings conforms with the 
relations in Figure 4, the majority of valuations is opposite to the relations in Figure 4. Table 10 contains 
but one exception to this rule [Income Distributions/Cutting Lorenz Curves/Rating/Italy].
34  
Insert Table 10 about here 
Again Lorenz dominance is more frequently confirmed for the ratings of income distributions than 
for lotteries, whereas the rating of Lorenz curves, which cut others from below, conforms less frequently 
with the Lorenz relations of Figure 4 for income distributions than for lotteries.  This shows, that, in 
terms of ratings, more subjects are inequality averse than risk averse. 
For the valuations, the mirror image of the ratings is also reflected in the individual data:  On 
average, only some 42% of the valuations of l otteries and some 37.5% of the valuations of income 
distributions conform with the Lorenz relations as displayed in Figure 4. Conformity for the lotteries is 
by some 4.5 percentage points higher than conformity for the income distributions.  There is a striking 
difference between Italy and Spain concerning the valuation of income distributions whose Lorenz 
curves cut others from below.  For this case we observe a conformity rate which is by 6.2 percentage 
points lower for Bari than for Castellón.  This, too, reflects more concern for lower incomes in Bari than 
in Castellón. 
 
                                                 
34Bari subjects care more for lower income echelons, which might be caused by the fact that people are less 
prosperous in Bari than in Castellón.   17 
 
3.3  Violations of the Transfer Principle 
 
The results of the previous sections demonstrate pronounced response–mode effects of the evaluation of 
income distributions and lotteries.  The CEs and EDEs are, therefore, no reliable tools for unambiguous 
assessment of the value which a subject attributes to an income distribution or a lottery.  This means that 
ethical or Kolm–Atkinson–Sen–type inequality measures lack an empirical bedrock. 
Another objection against these inequality measures is their empirical violation of the transfer 
principle.  Ethical inequality measures (let them be denoted by I) are theoretically required to satisfy  
1 1 0 £ - = £
m
EDE
I                                                                                                     (2) 
This can hold only if 0£ EDE£ m, where m denotes mean income. EDE>m implies violation of the 
transfer principle, the sacred cow of inequality measurement. If equal income distributions can be rules 
out (which is the case of our experimental design), EDE‡m implies violation of the transfer principle 
[and CE‡m implies violation of risk aversion]. As the expected value [mean income] of our lotteries 
[income distributions] is some €1,807 for Italy and some €1,745 for Spain, Table 2 shows us that the 
EDE<m is violated for the means for all but the negatively skewed income distributions. Notice, in 
contrast to that, that mean CEs exceed  m only for most positively skewed and the rectangular 
distributions. When restricting our inspection to the EDE and CE parameters only, we would end up 
with the finding that, with respect to the means, subjects are somewhat more risk averse than inequality 
averse.
35 
We analyze violations of the transfer principle and risk aversion by using individual data. Table 11 
displays the respective results. 
Insert Table 11 about here 
Table 11 confirms preponderance of violations of the transfer principle with the important 
exception of negatively skewed income distributions for the Italian data. For the domain of lotteries, 
more risk sympathy is registered for Italy than for Spain, with the exception of negatively skewed 
distributions [except distribution (2)] and the rectangular distribution. Notice that the violation rates of 
the transfer principle exceed the violation rates of risk aversion, with some exceptions among the 




                                                 
35 However, the mean ratings invalidate this one-sided conjecture, a phenomenon which is due to the ubiquity of   18 
 
3.4  Order Effects ans Happiness Engendered by Distributional Shapes 
Finally we tested for order and cultural effects as well as for lottery and income happiness. For 
this purpose we combined the data of both Italy and Spain to explain the ratings and valuations of 
lotteries and income distributions by distributional parameters. We started with standard deviation, 
skewness, kurtosis, maximum and minimum payoff (income), range, Gini coefficient, and with the 
probability of the maximum and minimum payoff (income). Moreover, for each of these variables we 
employed a dummy variable for Italy and Spain. First, we tested for multicollinearity based on variance 
inflation factors and had to eliminate all variables with exception of standard deviation, skewness, and 
kurtosis, as well as their dummies. This left us with the equation 
, e g b a g b a + D + + D + + D + + = KU KU SK SK SD SD C D              (3) 
to be estimated, where D denotes the dependent variable [calibrated rating or valuation] as a function of 
a constant C, the standard deviation SD, the skewness SK, and the kurtosis KU. The D’s denote dummy 
variables, where D=0 denotes Italy and D=1 denotes Spain.  e is the usual error term.  Then we applied 
the method of stepwise regression, successively eliminating coefficients until all remaining coefficients 
were significant at the 5% significance level.  The estimates of the coefficients are presented in Table 
12. 
Insert Table 12 about here 
Recall that we presented the stimulus material in the opposite order in Italy and Spain.  With the 
exception of the rating of distributions, all dummy variables prove to be insignificant.  This allows us to 
reject order effects because they should have been reflected in all four regressions.  The significant 
coefficients of the dummy variables for the rating of distributions can, therefore, be identified as cultural 
effects, which we have also noted above. 
Most spectacular, Table 12 shows that the signs of the explaining variables work in opposite 
directions for ratings and valuations.  The opposite signs of the explaining variables for ratings and 
valuations is, thus, another precipitation of preference reversal. 
Lottery rating depends only on skewness:  Negative [positive] skewness increases [decreases] 
lottery happiness.  This provides a splendid evidence for Parducci’s hypothesis that “happiness is a 
negatively skewed distribution". 
The rating of distributions is a decreasing function of the standard deviation.
36  Skewness and 
kurtosis matter for the Spanish data, such that negatively skewed and more peaked distributions breed 
higher happiness of income distributions for our Spanish subjects. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
preference reversals. 
36The standard deviation may well be considered as a proxy for Temkin’s aggregate complaints.  Cf.  also 
Devooght (2002).   19 
CE is an increasing function of standard deviation and kurtosis. This means that more dispersed an 
less peaked lotteries receive higher valuations.  EDE adds skewness to this explanation.  It is an 
increasing function of standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis. This means that more dispersed, less 
skewed and less peaked income distributions receive higher valuations. 
 
4.  Conclusion 
 
Although there is a close relationship between income distributions and risky prospects, their joint 
analysis is much in its infancy.  Moreover, multi–outcome distributions and lotteries have never been 
employed systematically, material incentives were only rarely used, preference reversal was never tested 
for income distributions (although the EDE has become the central hub of ethical inequality measures), 
and the influence of the distributional shapes on the evaluation of distributions and their perception of 
happiness has not been systematically investigated. 
The experimental design encompasses ten distributions (three negatively skewed, four positively 
skewed, one rectangular, one unimodal, and one bimodal), which were used as stimuli for an income–
distribution and a lottery experiment, which was administered to more than 50 subjects each both in 
Bari and Castellón. Subjects’ comprehension of the experimental setting was examined before the 
experiment proper and material payoffs were applied.  Subjects were asked to rate the lotteries or 
income distributions and were solicited to supply their CEs or EDEs using a BDM incentive scheme. 
The experimental data evidenced the following results:   
1.  We observed four patterns of preference reversals:   
(a) Classical preference reversal was confirmed for generalized P–bets and $–bets both for 
lotteries and income distributions. The ratings of the negatively skewed lotteries and 
income distributions tend to exceed the ratings of the positively skewed income 
distributions and lotteries.  The opposite holds for the respective CEs and EDEs.  
(b) The negatively skewed lotteries and income distributions tend to exceed the ratings of the 
unimodal, rectangular, and bimodal lotteries and income distributions.  The opposite holds 
for the respective CEs and EDEs. This documents a new kind of preference reversal which 
extends to both lotteries and income distributions.  
(c) Positively skewed income distributions with high minimum income and low maximum 
income (i.e., low standard deviation) exhibit higher ratings and lower valuations than 
positively skewed income distributions with low minimum income and high maximum 
income (i.e., high standard deviation). This new preference reversal is confined to income 
distributions only.    20 
(d) Unimodal, rectangular, and bimodal income distributions exhibit higher ratings and lower 
valuations than positively skewed income distributions with low minimum income and 
high maximum income (i.e., high standard deviation). This new preference reversal is 
confined to income distributions only.  
2.  The ratings of the lotteries and income distributions reflect Lorenz dominance, which signals a 
prevalence of risk and inequality aversion.  Moreover, the ratings assign higher ratings to 
lotteries and income distributions whose Lorenz curve cuts the Lorenz curve of other lotteries or 
income distributions from below, that is they do not mind low payoffs or incomes provided that 
they are outnumbered by sufficiently many moderate or high payoffs or incomes.  The opposite 
pattern is observed for the valuations, for which risk and inequality sympathy prevail.  
3.  The transfer principle is violated in more than 50% of all cases with the exception of income 
distributions for the Italian data.  This signals considerable equality aversion, which, too, reflects 
response–mode effects, as the transfer principle is tested by way of comparisons of EDEs and m. 
Note that equality aversion even exceeds risk sympathy.  
4.  Order effects can be ruled out.  Cultural effects exist only for the rating of income distributions.  
The explaining variables for ratings and valuations exhibit opposite signs.  In particular we 
observed the following relationships:   
(a) The rating of lotteries is a decreasing function of skewness, which validates the Parducci 
hypothesis, i.e., negatively skewed lotteries breed greater happiness.  
(b) The rating of income distributions is a decreasing function of standard deviation.  For 
Spain, the rating of distributions is also a decreasing function of skewness and kurtosis, 
which means that negatively skewed and more peaked distributions breed higher 
happiness of income distributions for the Spanish subjects.  
(c) The valuation of lotteries is an increasing function of standard deviation and kurtosis, 
which means that more dispersed and less peaked lotteries receive higher valuations.  
(d)  The valuation of income distributions is an increasing function of standard deviation, 
skewness, and kurtosis.  This means that more dispersed, less skewed and less peaked 
income distributions receive higher valuations.  The valuation–response–mode exhibits 
thus equality aversion.  
5.  The high incidence of inconsistencies between ratings and valuations (more than 50%) 
documents major response–mode effects.  Ratings seem to follow the prominence hypothesis, 
whereas valuations seem to follow the compatibility hypothesis.  This invalidates ethical or 
Kolm–Atkinson–Sen–type inequality measures if peoples’ imaginations of distributional equity 
are taken the measuring rod.  
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Figure 1:  Negatively Skewed Distributions 
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Figure 3:  Unimodal, Rectangular and Bimodal Distributions. 
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   Lotteries  Income Distributions 
   Italy  Spain  Italy  Spain 
  0.870**  0.825**  0.838**  Italy 
  0.802**  0.802**  0.815** 
0.936**    0.882**  0.883** 
Lotteries 
Spain 
0.912**    0.827**  0.851** 
0.702*  0.759*    0.918**  Italy 
0.626*  0.646*    0.988** 




0.802**  0.719*  0.845**   
** Significant at the 1% level.  
* Significant at the 5% level.  
Above:  Pearson Correlation Coefficients.  
Below:  Spearman’s Rank Correlation Coefficients.  
Above diagonal:  Right margins of Tables 4–7.  
Below diagonal:  Bottom margins of Tables 4–7.   
 





Ratings  Valuations  Mode 
Italy  Spain  Italy  Spain 
￿  92.3  100.0  0.0  23.1 
ﬁ  62.5  68.7  15.6  12.5  Lotteries 
All cases  71.1  77.8  11.1  15.6 
￿  76.9  100.0  7.7  23.1 
ﬁ  81.3  87.5  7.7  15.6 
Income 
Distributions 
All cases  80.0  91.1  8.9  15.6 
  




Rating  Valuation  Mode 
Italy  Spain  Italy  Spain 
￿  63.6  66.8  38.2  48.4 
ﬁ  51.3  54.1  41.0  42.0  Lotteries 
All cases  54.9  57.8  40.2  43.9 
￿  48.9  62.2  34.9  41.1 
ﬁ  65.7  64.9  38.8  36.1 
Income 
Distributions 
All cases  60.8  64.1  37.7  37.6 
  
Table 10:  Conformity of Individual Behavior with Lorenz Relations in Percentages. 
 





Lotteries  Income Distributions  Shape of 
 Distributions  Italy  Spain  Italy  Spain 
1  36.5  51.0  28.6  50.0 
2  57.7  52.9  46.4  68.0 
3  32.7  47.1  46.4  58.0 
Negatively 
Skewed 
Average  42.3  50.33  40.5  58.7 
4  57.7  49.0  71.4  64.0 
5  57.7  27.5  62.5  54.0 
6  57.7  54.9  67.9  68.0 
7  53.8  54.9  53.6  76.0 
Positively 
Skewed 
Average  56.2  46.6  63.9  65.5 
Unimodal  8  61.5  49.0  83.9  62.0 
Rectangular  9  59.6  52.9  67.8  68.0 
Bimodal  10  50.0  54.9  62.5  70.0 
 
Table 11:  Violations of the Transfer Principle (Inequality Aversion) and Risk Aversion  






Table 12:  Coefficient Estimates of the Parameters of Lotteries and Distributions. 
 
 